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On September 3 and 4, 2006, the Payment Cards Center of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia and the Electronic Funds Transfer Association (EFTA) hosted a conference 
entitled “Information Security, Data Breaches, and Protecting Cardholder Information: 
Facing Up to the Challenges.” The two-day event was designed to bring together a 
diverse set of stakeholders from the U.S. payments industry to discuss a framework to 
guide industry practices and inform public policy. In attendance were individuals from 
the major payments networks, card issuers, and banks, as well as consumer and merchant 
representatives and regulators. Conference participants emphasized that the industry must 
address two fundamental issues: () increasingly dangerous threats to sensitive consumer 
information and (2) public perception and understanding of the risks from data breaches. 
These challenges are related but need different solutions. A consensus emerged that while 
the situation is not yet dire, it is serious. All payments stakeholders must be ready to work 
together to devise solutions today so that the benefits of the electronic payments system are 
uninterrupted in the future.
* Payment Cards Center, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Ten Independence Mall, Philadelphia, PA 
19106. E-mail: james.c.mcgrath@phil.frb.org. The views expressed here are not necessarily those of this 
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I. Introduction 
  On September 3 and 4, 2006, the Payment 
Cards Center of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadel-
phia and the Electronic Funds Transfer Association 
(EFTA) hosted a conference entitled “Information 
Security, Data Breaches, and Protecting Cardholder 
Information: Facing Up to the Challenges.” The two-
day event was designed to bring together a diverse set 
of stakeholders from the U.S. payments industry to 
discuss a framework to guide industry practices and 
inform public policy.
  In attendance were individuals 
from the major payments networks, card issuers, and 




  The conference sessions addressed two fun-
damental questions. First, what can be done to more 
effectively ensure data security throughout the entire 
payments chain? Second, should a breach occur, what 
are the appropriate actions that should be taken to 
protect consumers and mitigate risks associated with 
any compromised data?
  These issues have come to the fore as a variety 
of breaches from a number of firms have been widely 
publicized in the media.  Consequently, they have 
become a topic of debate in Washington and state 
capitals across the country. Breaches threaten to un-
dermine a fundamental underpinning of the payments 
industry: consumer confidence in the industry’s ability 
to protect and safeguard sensitive customer informa-
tion. A related discussion covered the concurrent need 
for hard data to critically evaluate the severity of the 
perceived threat and to increase public understand-
ing of the real nature of the threat. Intertwined were 
discussions as to how these issues might be reflected in 
the emerging legal and regulatory framework.
  Charles I. Plosser, president of the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Philadelphia, opened the conference on 
Wednesday afternoon. Plosser focused the audience’s 
attention on how advances in technology and changes 
in regulation are changing the payments landscape. 
These changes are of interest to a variety of partici-
pants and stakeholders, including the Federal Reserve 
System. Plosser introduced Bruce J. Summers, director 
of Federal Reserve Information Technology (FRIT), 
whose keynote address elaborated on these implica-
tions.
  Summers oversees the area of the Federal 
Reserve responsible for standards and information 
architecture used throughout the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem. He described how the fiduciary responsibilities of 
commercial banks and the Federal Reserve Banks have 
grown along with the advent of electronic banking 
and the increased reliance on information technology. 
Summers framed his discussion of security by examin-
ing best practices for safeguarding information security 
in three forms: information “at rest,” that is, stored on 
a bank’s computer; information “in transit,” that is, on 
the move over networks; and “information traveling,” 
that is, on a laptop or other movable storage device.
3
  
  Summers’s address was followed by a panel 
discussion, “Baseline Issues for Payments Participants: 
Setting the Stage,” which incorporated perspectives of 
banks, merchants, networks, and technology provid-
ers. The panelists warned that consumer confidence 
is under siege because of real and perceived threats. 
At the same time, while fraud does exist, widespread 
misunderstanding of the practical issues is a compa-
rable concern. Panelists suggested that these problems 
should be addressed concurrently, but they emphasized 
that they involve different solutions and different in-
centives.
  H. Kurt Helwig, executive director of the Elec-
tronic Funds Transfer Association, opened the second 
day of the conference, emphasizing that security can 
serve as a key business differentiator. He observed that 
the companies attending the conference are well aware 
of security’s importance and take the issue very seri-
ously. Nevertheless, they also agree that they must do a 
better job communicating two things: what customers 
can do to help in the fight and what companies are do-
ing internally to protect customer data. Communicat-
ing this message is critical, he warned, because losing 
consumer confidence may threaten the underlying pay-
ments business itself.
  These insights would be echoed throughout 
the day’s sessions. In particular, Orson Swindle, senior 
policy advisor and chair of the Center for Information 
Policy Leadership at Hunton & Williams, a major in-
ternational law firm, expanded on these themes with 
 For the conference agenda, see Exhibit , on page 23.
2 For a list of the institutions represented at the conference, see Exhibit 2 
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a keynote on the second morning of the conference: 
“The Sky Is Not Falling — But It Could.”
4  Swindle 
emphasized that the payments industry is predicated 
on the free interchange of information. This openness 
has brought about great innovation, but it increasingly 
presents unique risks. He called on conference partici-
pants to apply sound principles and solutions, many of 
which already exist, to ensure that customers’ data are 
protected. Doing so, he argued, can be a competitive 
advantage.
  Swindle’s address was followed by a panel, 
“Ensuring Data Security,” which delved into concrete 
technologies, solutions, and best practices that can be 
brought to bear to address the problem. The panelists 
related the increased sophistication of fraudsters who 
continue to challenge increasingly rigorous solutions. 
The industry finds itself playing a game of cat and 
mouse, but at the same time, the panelists argued that 
there are viable practices and procedures that can pro-
vide a defensible data protection strategy.
  Two afternoon panels concluded the confer-
ence. The first, “After a Breach: Protecting Customers 
and Consumers,” focused on what to do if and when 
a breach occurs. Panelists emphasized that early plan-
ning is critical; the most robust data security program 
must be accompanied by a well-defined action plan in 
the event that the unthinkable occurs. Among the is-
sues discussed were the role and shape of notifications, 
consumer sentiment and understanding, and the impli-
cations for payments providers.
  The second, “Legal and Regulatory Perspec-
tives,” attempted to place the issues raised throughout 
the conference into the emerging legal and regulatory 
framework. The panelists contrasted state and federal 
initiatives, discussed trends in regulation and enforce-
ment, and addressed the degree to which the regula-
tory environment has been a constructive partner in 
designing solutions.
  To close, Peter Burns, director of the Philadel-
phia Federal Reserve Bank’s Payment Cards Center, 
summarized several of the conference’s key themes. He 
noted that effective industrywide solutions are impera-
tive. These must be built around the correct incen-
tives, should include the full range of stakeholders, and 
should encourage collaboration. A compelling business 
case exists for effective security; the challenge will be 
to develop and explain it. Burns noted that the Federal 
Reserve can contribute to this effort by convening the 
right people and encouraging a frank and open debate, 
as was evident during the discussions that took place 
over the course of the conference. 
II. Wednesday’s Keynote Address: 
Bruce J. Summers
  Bruce J. Summers opened the conference with 
a keynote address entitled “Fiduciary Responsibilities 
in the Era of Electronic Banking: A Central Banker’s 
Perspective.”
  In his remarks he described how the 
evolution of electronic processes and the impact of 
information technologies have expanded the concept 
of fiduciary responsibility for all financial institutions, 
including the Federal Reserve Banks. While acknowl-
edging clear differences between the Federal Reserve 
and private-sector banking institutions, Summers em-
phasized that the Fed and financial institutions have 
many issues in common when it comes to considering 
the challenges associated with information security. He 
framed his discussion of data security practices at the 
Federal Reserve by considering data in three distinct 
environments. 
  Summers briefly outlined the Federal Reserve’s 
responsibilities, including conducting monetary policy, 
supervising and regulating banking institutions, and 
maintaining the stability of the financial system. For 
the purposes of this discussion, he focused on the Fed’s 
role as a provider of payment services and the impact 
advances in information technology have had on rede-
fining the Fed’s own sense of fiduciary responsibilities. 
  Like all financial institutions, the Federal Re-
serve Banks have had a long-standing focus on their 
responsibility for protecting financial assets under 
their stewardship. The age of electronics, however, 
has broadened these fiduciary responsibilities to incor-
porate the security of information assets as well. He 
argued that all financial fiduciaries, including central 
banks, need to embrace the concept of “electronic 
 Summers joined the Federal Reserve System in 974 and has been the 
director of Federal Reserve Information Technology (FRIT) for the past 0 
years, overseeing the central bank’s IT environment in a period of dynamic 
change. FRIT is responsible for the Federal Reserve System’s information 
technology architecture and standards. It also provides technology services 
to the 2 Federal Reserve Banks and the Board of Governors. Before Sum-
mers assumed responsibility for IT, his career with the Federal Reserve 
included a broad range of business management positions. 
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vaults” to protect information assets in the same way 
that steel vaults have long been employed to protect 
physical assets. The technology used to secure informa-
tion in an electronic vault, such as cryptography, can 
be costly, leading to important funding and budgeting 
decisions. Summers noted that weighing these invest-
ment decisions against the potential costs of not doing 
so are concerns common to all institutions entrusted 
with customer information, whether they be private 
banks, other businesses, or the Federal Reserve. 
  In describing the challenges of ensuring data 
security, Summers framed the issue by categorizing data 
into three broad states: data-at-rest, data-in-transit, 
and data-on-travel. Data at rest — that is, data residing 
on computers or other devices inside an organization 
— present a particular risk because of the data’s vul-
nerability to insider threats, often the hardest threats 
to protect against. Summers pointed out that to protect 
data at rest from insider threats, institutions need tech-
nology solutions and human resource practices that fo-
cus on data security. At the Fed and other institutions, 
practices such as internal network segmentation and 
the doctrine of least privilege are used to protect data 
at rest. Finally, strong methods for authenticating the 
identity of those with access to the data are also critical 
mechanisms for protecting data at rest. 
  Summers stated that security of data in transit 
— information traveling over networks — is in some 
sense the most straightforward challenge to address.6  
Summers noted that strong encryption systems along 
with strong authentication methods go a long way 
toward ensuring the security of information traveling 
over networks. 
  Data on travel — on a laptop or other trans-
portable storage device — presents a relatively new 
challenge. Data are no longer stored just on comput-
ers; they’re also stored on thumb-drives, PDAs, cell 
phones, and so forth. To address these new challenges, 
the Federal Reserve has policies that define appropri-
ate use of data and how and where the data can be 
transported. Hard-disk encryption and limitations on 
user-administration privileges are two examples of Fed 
practices aimed at protecting data on transportable 
storage devices.  
  In closing, Summers reiterated that in the era 
of electronic banking, the importance of protecting in-
formation assets has been elevated to at least the same 
level as traditional concerns about protecting physical 
assets, and arguably, protecting electronic informa-
tion presents a more complex challenge. Summers 
emphasized the importance of recognizing the business 
value of meeting information security issues in three 
ways. First, just as money belongs in a physical vault, 
sensitive information belongs in an electronic vault. 
Second, data must be protected at rest, in transit, and 
on travel. Third, we need to think about security holis-
tically; it involves both people and technology. 
  Summers’s comments highlighted data security 
as a fiduciary responsibility of the Federal Reserve and, 
even more broadly, of financial institutions and other 
payment providers. Moreover, he emphasized that the 
recent movement toward electronic payments has in-
troduced a different set of risks than those found in the 
traditional paper-based system.  The themes developed 
in these opening remarks were addressed more specifi-
cally in the conference discussions that followed.  
III. Thursday’s Keynote Address: 
Orson Swindle
  Orson Swindle
7 opened the second day of the 
conference with his keynote address, “Information 
Security: The Sky Is Not Falling – But It Could.” In 
his remarks, Swindle emphasized that while we may 
not be in a crisis with respect to data breaches today, 
the risks to the financial services industry are indeed 
real. Swindle addressed several issues that were subse-
quently echoed throughout the conference: the costly 
consequences of compromises, the need for solutions 
that emphasize collaboration and cooperation among 
participants all along the payments chain, and the role 
of government agencies. He concluded by urging that 
efforts to address data security also take into account 
the critical role that the free flow of information has in 
6 Securing data in transit may be less straightforward in the private sector, 
where there is often a more extensive processing chain with multiple parties 
using several networks. Many participants referenced the Payment Card 
Industry Data Security Standard (PCI) throughout the conference as an 
important mechanism for ensuring compliance with data security standards 
all along the card processing chain.  
7 Prior to joining the Center for Information Policy Leadership at Hunton 
& Williams, LLP , as the senior policy advisor and chair of information secu-
rity projects, Swindle had a distinguished career in public service. He served 
in the Reagan administration from 98 to 989, first with the Department 
of Agriculture, then as assistant secretary of commerce for development. 
From 998 to 200 he served as one of the five commissioners of the  
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the modern economy and in enhancing public welfare. 
  Swindle began with the assertion that data 
security measures “may be costly to employ, but more 
costly not to.” He described several of the direct fi-
nancial costs that a firm whose data security has been 
compromised might face, including stock market ef-
fects,
8 exposure to fines from card networks and gov-
ernment agencies, and the direct costs associated with 
notifications, card replacement, and customer service 
support. In addition, Swindle explained that, given 
cause, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is empow-
ered to order firms to undergo annual security audits 
for up to 20 years following a breach, an obviously 
onerous and costly exercise. 
  Swindle argued that while these direct finan-
cial costs should serve as significant motivating factors 
for individual firms, a potentially greater cost to the 
industry may result from a loss in consumer confi-
dence. Should consumers lose confidence in the safety 
of electronic payments and commerce, they might 
abandon these channels and revert to less efficient 
means of making purchases and payments. He char-
acterized this risk in terms of an “opportunity cost” in 
that e-merchants and payment providers risk losing the 
opportunity to regain the abandoned transactions. 
  In protecting data security, Swindle empha-
sized that the system as a whole is only as strong as the 
weakest link. A data compromise can occur anywhere 
in the payments chain but will affect all stakeholders. 
He urged conference participants, in their search for 
solutions, to develop strategies that incorporate col-
laboration and cooperation among all stakeholders.
  While acknowledging the efforts of Con-
gress to create federal standards for responses to data 
breaches, Swindle focused on two other important 
roles government can play. In the first case, govern-
ment agencies – including the Federal Reserve – are 
appropriate parties to help facilitate information shar-
ing and encourage collaboration among payments 
industry stakeholders. Second, as data breaches and 
resulting fraud have become international issues, it is 
critical that the U.S. government take the lead in en-
suring cooperation and coordination among national 
law enforcement agencies and governments.  
  In all of the discussion about data security, 
Swindle urged that we not lose sight of the importance 
that data and information technologies play in our 
modern economy. Information is a valuable and power-
ful resource that has led to any number of welfare-im-
proving innovations. Going beyond the familiar exam-
ple of the payment cards industry where competency in 
managing information is at the heart of business model 
innovations, Swindle provided another provocative ex-
ample from the medical research field. As he described, 
medical research breakthroughs depend heavily on 
the ability to access and analyze data on as many trial 
subjects as possible and across as many states, regions, 
or nations as possible. As this example illustrates, we 
need to be vigilant in protecting sensitive information 
but we must also recognize that the free flow of infor-
mation is often a critical element in welfare-enhancing 
innovation. 
  Swindle closed by asking conference partici-
pants to acknowledge the increasingly dynamic nature 
of the challenge and to think beyond the current en-
vironment and address information security issues by 
looking forward five to 0 years. He called for innova-
tions to protect consumer information and emphasized 
the importance of maintaining consumer confidence 
through open and clear communication.  Consumers 
need to know that the industry is concerned, mak-
ing changes and taking precautions to protect their 
information. Swindle stressed that “we all have a role 
to play and we need to get it right.” Swindle’s address 
brought a sense of urgency to the issues surrounding 
data security and set an effective framework for the 
second day of the conference.
IV. Background 
  The national media have frequently and wide-
ly publicized security breaches, and these reports have 
attracted the attention of policymakers and caused 
unease and confusion among the public. While data 
breaches are indeed a serious issue that industry par-
ticipants and consumers must confront, they are often 
poorly understood. The conference discussions were 
oriented toward teasing out the actual extent of the 
risk, discussing containment and mitigation strategies, 
and exploring where and how regulatory involvement 
may be constructive.
  A unifying theme that emerged was that pay-
ment industry stakeholders have two related but dis-
8 He noted that typical market-value declines of 9 to percent follow a 
public company’s announcement of a breach.Information Security, Data Breaches, and Protecting Cardholder Information    9  www.philadelphiafed.org/pcc
tinct problems to address and these problems call for 
different kinds of solutions. First, there is a growing, 
real threat to the security of information used within 
the payment system. Second, growing public concern 
about these issues threaten consumer confidence in 
the payment system. If consumers lose confidence in 
the safety of the system because of legitimate concerns 
or overreactions to poorly understood media accounts, 
the industry may lose its flexibility in developing and 
applying innovations that could ultimately improve 
the efficiency of payments. Moreover, since payments 
are a “two-sided platform market,” the risks flow in 
both directions. As panelist Tom Arnold, of PSC, 
warned, merchants themselves could lose faith in cer-
tain electronic-based payment instruments and may 
ultimately be hesitant or unwilling to adopt these pay-
ments innovations.
  Both of these problems threaten to undermine 
the very foundation of the payments industry. The 
payment system has been built on the open and rapid 
transmission of data between payment providers and 
consumers. Both adverse public reaction and stopgap 
regulatory interventions could increase frictions in this 
process, participants argued, reducing efficiency and 
increasing costs.
  In summary, there are very real risks and sub-
stantial misunderstanding about threats to data secu-
rity. Yet, as conference participants noted, solutions 
to many of these threats already exist. Successfully 
addressing the problem will require a holistic approach 
and long-term involvement, and even if the risks can-
not be completely eliminated, they can be controlled. 
It is incumbent upon all participants in the payments 
system to work together to ensure that this happens. 
At the same time, some payments participants empha-
sized the need to use media and marketing proactively, 
to encourage safe practices, and to explain how the 
industry is working to protect consumers’ data.
  This paper will echo many of the findings of 
the conference. While the paper is broadly organized 
along the same lines as the sessions over the two days, 
it does not offer a verbatim transcript. Rather, it seeks 
to integrate insights from the various panelists, speak-
ers, and the audience into a thematic exploration 
of various aspects of data breaches and their conse-
quences. It begins with a brief discussion of the costs of 
data breaches to consumers and to firms and includes 
an in-depth look at the concept of identity theft to es-
tablish a consistent vocabulary to be used throughout 
the rest of the paper. Data breaches do not necessarily 
lead to identity theft, nor are they the only means by 
which identity theft may occur. However, because the 
two concepts are frequently associated, at times incor-
rectly, defining terms clearly is useful. The paper then 
addresses the extent of the problem, what can be done 
to prevent data breaches, and how to respond if one 
does occur. Finally, it addresses challenges associated 
with disclosures and closes with a consideration of the 
role of government and opportunities for the Federal 
Reserve and other agencies to further contribute to the 
debate.  
V. Framing the Issues
  Data breaches and their consequences have 
become more prominent in the press — in part be-
cause of recent state and federal regulations requiring 
their disclosure — though not necessarily better under-
stood. California’s Senate Bill 386, which was enacted 
in August 2002 and became effective in July 2003, has 
become a benchmark for data breach notification. It 
has effectively required firms that do business in Cali-
fornia to notify consumers when a data breach has oc-
curred, regardless of whether the information lost has 
fallen into the wrong hands, is suspected to have been 
used illegally, or has contributed to identity theft.
9  The 
California market is sufficiently large that if consumers 
there are affected, a breach likely has consequences 
nationwide. Thus, the California notification require-
ment has served as a de facto notification requirement 
to customers across the country. 
  According to a study conducted by the 
Ponemon Institute and the law firm of White & Case, 
LLP , 23 million consumers recall receiving a breach 
notification in the past year. Another survey reveals 
that 2 million consumers had their personal informa-
tion breached in approximately 00 separate incidents 
in 200 alone.
0  However, such large numbers are 
difficult to interpret. Some individuals may be double 
counted and some incorrectly identified. Most impor-
tant, data breaches vary in their potential to cause 
9 http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/0-02/bill/sen/sb_3-400/sb_386_bill_
20020926_chaptered.html 
0 VigilantMinds, Inc., “State Security Breach Legislation,” February 2006. 
(http://www.vigilantminds.com/files/vigilantminds_state_security_breach_
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damages. The loss of account numbers without names 
and addresses, for example, is potentially less damaging 
than a data file that cross-references that data file with 
Social Security numbers.
  Because of these complica-
tions and others, increased emphasis on notification 
and subsequent media coverage have raised as many 
questions as they have answered. 
  One of the recurring subtexts of the confer-
ence was the difficulty that consumers, policymakers, 
and even some in the payments industry itself have in 
agreeing on terminology to describe the consequences 
of data breaches. Or they may confuse the report of 
a data breach with actual fraud. Additionally, media 
reports will often lump many substantively different 
frauds under the catchall of identity theft, but as many 
conference participants noted, doing so may confuse 
the discussion and make it more difficult to fashion 
effective solutions. In some cases, policymakers them-
selves have struggled with the lack of consistent ter-
minology, compounding the difficultly in formulating 
constructive regulation.
  The term data breach has come to mean 
simply the breach or loss of computerized data that 
includes personal information. However, since much 
hangs on how the data are defined, how they are 
breached, and who may have gained access, discussions 
of data breaches, especially within the government and 
regulatory community, may help to refine and qualify 
this simple definition. 
  Such breaches can occur through a number 
of channels; most, according to a recent Ponemon 
Institute study,
2 arise from lost or stolen computer 
hardware or media;
3 fewer come about through delib-
erate system hacks, viruses, Trojan horses, or similar 
technological assaults. Importantly, as Lynne B. Barr, 
of Goodwin Procter, noted, the occurrence of a data 
breach does not imply that the company involved has 
been negligent.
4  
  After a breach, whether it was caused by 
chance or deliberately, the compromised information 
could potentially be used to perpetrate fraud, includ-
ing that associated with identity theft. Identity theft 
becomes important in the discussion of data breaches 
because it is one of the most highly publicized, yet least 
understood consequences, as well as arguably the most 
serious potential consequence for consumers.
  Next, this summary will consider the conse-
quences of data breaches to consumers, focusing par-
ticularly on identity theft. It then considers the conse-
quences of data breaches for firms and financial insti-
tutions, before examining the evidence regarding the 
connection between identity theft and data breaches.
VI. Data Breaches, Identity Theft, and 
the Impact on Consumers
  Data breaches affect consumers in two princi-
pal ways. First, consumers are subject to uncertainty, 
confusion, and potentially a loss of confidence in the 
payments system when they hear about data breaches. 
If they do receive a breach notification, they often 
struggle to understand what it means and how it could 
be relevant to their own situation. This process can 
take time and cause anxiety. Second, consumers could 
become victims of identity theft, which could lead to 
much more aggravation and cause real financial losses.
  A baseline definition of identity theft can be 
found in the Identity Theft and Assumption Deter-
rence Act of 998, in which identity theft is described 
as a range of illegal activities that use a person’s per-
sonal information to perpetrate a crime. While that 
definition remains true, it begs a more nuanced un-
derstanding, since the definition covers crimes ranging 
from those involving a lost or stolen credit card, to 
sophisticated schemes to surreptitiously open new ac-
counts in a victim’s name. While conference attendees 
disagreed somewhat over which terms to use, they gen-
 Increasingly, these lines have been blurred, since many organizations 
have been accumulating and storing data with personal identifying informa-
tion, including Social Security numbers, for which there is an ambiguous 
business justification. In fact, the California Office of Privacy Protection 
reports that 8 percent of the security breaches in its survey involved Social 
Security numbers, exposing those victims to considerable risk. See Califor-
nia Office of Privacy Protection, “Recommended Practices on Notice of 
Security Breach Involving Personal Information,” April 2006.
2 Ponemon Institute, “2006 Annual Study: Cost of a Data Breach,” Oc-
tober 2006; available at http://www.vontu.com/uploadedFiles/global/2006_
Cost_of_Data_Breach_Report_V_2.pdf. 
3 Or in the terminology applied by Bruce Summers, “data on travel.”
4 As Joel Winston, of the Federal Trade Commission, would note, data 
breaches per se do not violate the law. A company can take reasonable pre-
cautions and still be victimized. However, the failure to adequately secure 
consumer data can be grounds for being found in violation of the “unfair 
or deceptive practices” standard of the Federal Trade Commission Act and 
possibly the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACT 
Act), the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
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erally agreed on a three-tier hierarchy of identity theft 
categories to refine the concept further. For the pur-
poses of this summary, the terms payment card fraud, 
account takeover fraud, and true name fraud will be 
used.
  Definitions do matter because the causes and 
consequences of these different types of fraud can be 
starkly different.
  Payment card fraud is generally the least 
damaging type of fraud for the consumer. It involves 
criminals stealing payment cards or account numbers 
of existing accounts to purchase goods or services. In 
this type of fraud, consumers retain control over the 
account relationship. It is often quickly discovered by 
card issuers’ fraud detection software or as consum-
ers review their statements, and thus the scope of the 
fraud is limited. Because federal law and card network 
policies limit liability for fraudulent purchases, con-
sumers have very few out-of-pocket expenses. They 
can be issued a new card and the fraud is contained.
  In contrast, account takeover fraud is more 
insidious. Rather than making a few illicit purchases, 
in such frauds, criminals have access to more detailed 
consumer information, allowing them to attempt to 
take complete control of a credit or debit account and 
entirely deplete it. They even occasionally cloak their 
activities by changing the billing address so that they 
can benefit from extra days or weeks of unnoticed 
fraudulent activity. 
  For consumers, true name fraud is even more 
insidious. Here, criminals use a consumer’s personal 
identifying information, or PII, to create new credit 
accounts attached to other addresses without the 
consumer’s knowledge. The consumer will likely not 
receive any statements or other communication — at 
least initially — that would indicate that these ac-
counts exist, making detection very difficult until the 
damage is already done. As panelist Daniel Buttafogo, 
of Barclaycard US, argued, breaches leading to the 
loss of personal identifying information can result in 
the most costly and hard to control fraud. When this 
happens, consumers will need a lot more hand-holding 
during the difficult process of cleaning up the damage 
that could result. Stuart Pratt, of the Consumer Data 
Industry Association, reported that fortunately, FTC 
data indicate that fewer than one-third of identity theft 
cases involve this severe form of fraud. However, the 
data also suggest that about 000 people per 00,000 
are victims of true name fraud. While less frequent 
than other crimes such as burglary or robbery, this 
crime still involves a considerable number of victims. 
  Consumers face potentially large costs in time 
and money when they become victims of this crime. 
For instance, Javelin Strategy and Research reports 
that the average out-of-pocket expense to true name 
fraud victims is $422 and they spend 40 hours of their 
time cleaning up the problem.
6  Fortunately, 68 per-
cent of identity theft victims actually incur no out-of-
pocket expenses. However, financial institutions and 
merchants do pay a price — often a sizable one.
VII. The Impact of Data Breaches on 
Businesses
  For firms, data breaches may cause consider-
able expense, whether or not identity theft arises. 
For instance, the Ponemon Institute found that the 
average cost of a breach, above and beyond any con-
sequences of the misuse of data that may result, was 
$82 per data record. Per incident, for the 3 breaches 
covered in the study, this amounts to an average cost 
of $4.8 million per incident, per firm, and reflects an 
increase of 30 percent over the costs of a year before.
7  
  These costs primarily derive from the compa-
ny’s notification response. Many card issuers whose 
customers’ data may have been compromised often 
choose the more expensive tack of contacting consum-
ers by phone rather than mail. Further, acknowledging 
the risk that victims may opt to close accounts, issuers 
may also offer incentives to customers to discourage 
them from taking their business elsewhere. Finally, the 
tab could include fines and restitution ordered by the 
Federal Trade Commission or banking regulators and 
 A more extensive discussion of identity theft, these categorizations, 
consequences, and best responses can be found in the PCC paper by Julia 
S. Cheney, “Identity Theft: Do Definitions Still Matter?,” August 200. 
Cheney discusses a fourth type of fraud — fictitious identity fraud — in 
which criminals may combine legitimate information with made-up in-
formation to “create an identity that does not belong to any real person.” 
While this type of fraud can indeed be costly, it was not discussed at the 
conference. For the purpose of this discussion, these fraud losses, which are 
generally absorbed by financial institutions or merchants, are addressed in 
the next section of this summary.
6 Rubina Johannes, “2006 Identity Fraud Survey Report,” Javelin Strategy 
and Research, January 2006, available at http://www.javelinstrategy.com/
products/AD3BA/27/delivery.pdf. 
7 Daniel Wolfe, “Higher Costs for Data Breaches — Both Old and New,” 
American Banker, October 24, 2006. 
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the costs of paying for credit monitoring services for 
consumers whose data were exposed.8 
  The direct financial costs from data breaches 
are just the beginning. Organizations may also face 
regulatory, reputational, and opportunity costs as well. 
Joel Winston, of the Federal Trade Commission, de-
tailed a number of ways in which financial institutions 
can be punished in the event of a data breach — from 
card association penalties to fines imposed by various 
regulators. There are also ways to penalize nonbank 
organizations, and most of the penalties flow from the 
Federal Trade Commission. The FTC has the author-
ity to impose an annual 20-year audit requirement 
on firms that were subject to a breach and that were 
found to have failed to adequately secure customer 
data. Such audits can be rigorous; complying with 
them for 20 years can be costly.
  Finally, as Gray Taylor, from the National As-
sociation of Convenience Stores, noted, the damage 
to a firm’s reputation may be the most severe penalty. 
Even if victims of a data breach do not suffer direct 
negative consequences such as identity theft, confer-
ence participants highlighted the fact that consumers 
may lose confidence in the organization holding their 
data. According to the Ponemon Institute, 20 percent 
of consumers who received notice of a security breach 
immediately terminated their accounts. This number 
indicates a potentially severe threat. While changing a 
long-standing relationship involves considerable fric-
tions, it is very easy to find other providers who haven’t 
appeared in negative media reports.9  Thus, while a 
20 percent decrease in accounts is very serious, Orson 
Swindle emphasized that the ultimate problem, while 
not directly measurable, is the opportunity cost of lost 
business. If consumers lose confidence in the electronic 
payments system, they may avoid online transactions 
altogether or revert to greater use of cash or checks. 
Were this to happen, revenues associated with these 
lost transactions would never be realized. The policy 
implications for the continued evolution of a more ef-
ficient payment system are also clear.  
VIII. The Connection Between Data 
Breaches and Identity Theft
  As discussed earlier, a data breach need not 
lead to identity theft, and identity theft often arises 
from compromised data obtained from sources not gen-
erally associated with public accounts of data breaches. 
For example, according to Javelin research, most iden-
tity theft fraud arises not from data breaches but rather 
from data stolen by acquaintances or family members 
or from lost or stolen wallets or statements.
20  Similarly, 
a malicious employee with access to consumers’ per-
sonal identifying information can cause real problems 
by simply copying relevant information about an indi-
vidual or groups of individuals. Indeed, according to 
Bruce Summers and others, this has become a growing 
concern, requiring organizations to develop new inter-
nal access controls.
  Complicating matters is the difficulty involved 
in conclusively tying a given breach to consequent 
reports of actual identity theft. Additionally, accord-
ing to Daniel Buttafogo, frictions in the post-breach 
notification process mean that affected individuals may 
not know they are at risk until a year or more after the 
actual data compromise. The upshot of this is that the 
damaging effects of a given breach may be significantly 
remote in time from when it actually happened and the 
communication of the potential risks slow, compound-
ing the difficulties faced by issuers’ fraud management 
teams, law enforcement, and consumers.
  However, if the breach does lead to identity 
theft, the toll can quickly escalate. On one hand, as a 
recent survey suggests, the odds of a data breach re-
sulting in some sort of identity theft are comparatively 
small.
2  Indeed, the Javelin study estimates that only 
0.8 percent of consumers exposed to a data breach 
become victims of fraud. At the same time, Javelin 
estimates that during 2006, approximately 9 million 
8 Firms also bear sizable costs from identity theft. According to the Javelin 
study, the average cost per identity fraud case has increased from $,249 to 
$6,383 over the past two years. If we incorporate the decrease in the an-
nual number of incidents, this means that the total one-year cost of identity 
fraud in the United States, across all industries, grew slightly between 2003 
and 2006, increasing from $3.2 billion to $6.6 billion — a very substan-
tial sum. 
9 The Ponemon Institute has prepared an estimate of the extent of losses 
due to account churn induced by a data breach. See the Ponemon Institute, 
“National Survey on Data Security Breach Notification,” September 26, 
200. 
20 Rubina Johannes, “2006 Identity Fraud Survey Report,” Javelin Strat-
egy and Research, January 2006, available at http://www.javelinstrategy.
com/products/AD3BA/27/delivery.pdf. This Javelin report is an update to 
research originally published by the Federal Trade Commission and Syno-
vate, a consulting firm. It is available at the FTC’s website at http://www.
consumer.gov/idtheft.  
2 Mary T. Monahan, “Data Breaches and Identity Fraud: Misunderstanding 
Could Fail Consumers and Burden Businesses,” Javelin Strategy and Re-
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individuals had some portion of their personal identify-
ing information exposed as a result of data breaches. 
Together, these numbers imply that over 70,000 people 
could be victimized by data-breach-related identity 
theft at some point — a not insignificant number. 
  From another perspective, Javelin estimates 
that 6 percent of all known identity theft is generated 
from data breaches. If overall identity theft losses are 
$6.6 billion, this implies that approximately $3.3 bil-
lion of this sum derives from data breach incidents. 
  Finally, other observers note that recent experi-
ences suggest that fraud resulting from data breaches 
may be growing and may result in identity theft more 
often than in the past. For instance, Daniel  
Buttafogo noted that several incidents have occurred 
in which the sensitive data encoded on thousands of 
cards’ magnetic stripes have been compromised in a 
data breach. The loss of this particular kind of data 
can be especially costly to issuers and consumers, since 
a sophisticated criminal can use this information to 
create counterfeit cards to make purchases or ATM 
withdrawals.
  Data breaches expose consumers and firms to 
risks across a number of dimensions. Thus far, identity 
theft has been a relatively infrequent consequence of a 
data breach, but because it is so disruptive for consum-
ers — especially if it is the most pernicious type, true 
name fraud — it constitutes a real concern. Moreover, 
virtually all consumers are affected by widely publi-
cized accounts of data breaches, potentially influenc-
ing their behavior and confidence in the use of elec-
tronic payments. 
  On the supply side of the payments industry, 
firms bear many direct incremental costs related to 
data breach notification and other customer service 
requirements, and they are further subject to the im-
position of fines and potential sanctions by the FTC. 
They also often suffer from lost productivity due to the 
need to quickly redeploy resources to contain a breach 
and mitigate its consequences. Additionally, financial 
institutions and merchants disproportionately bear 
the high costs of identity theft, since they, rather than 
consumers, ultimately bear the expense of fraudulent 
accounts. Finally, the opportunity cost of lost business 
constitutes a costly, though difficult to quantify threat.  
IX. The Incentive Problem
  Clearly, the issues outlined above and dis-
cussed in detail during the conference present a very 
serious challenge to stakeholders in the payments 
system. However, attendees also argued that some 
payments participants have not yet done all they can 
to address this problem. Many technological solutions 
may already exist, but to date, there have been prob-
lems devising effective incentives to induce merchants, 
issuers, and networks to make the necessary investment 
and commitment. For instance, the ability exists to 
process PINs for every transaction, to use chip technol-
ogy, and to use a private key and data encryption for all 
transmissions, but these have not been mandated and 
have seen limited implementation. As Daniel 
Buttafogo and Gray Taylor observed, many in the 
payments business responsible for fraud management 
would welcome enhanced authentication tools such as 
chip and PIN technology, but the costs are high and it 
is not clear who is able or willing to pay for this.
  Such additional investment has been slow 
to materialize for a number of reasons. First, by some 
measures, the payment card industry has done a good 
job controlling fraud. With credit card fraud holding 
fairly steady at 7 basis points (0.07 percent), net of 
chargebacks,
22 the costs associated with this effort are 
significant. Credit card networks, issuers, and other 
industry participants have invested substantial sums, 
over many years, in information technology and pro-
cedures to detect and prevent fraud on their systems. 
The industry’s ability to maintain fraud at a relatively 
low and steady rate is a testament to the efficacy of 
that investment. Nonetheless, as panelists affirmed, 
the industry would always like to see lower fraud rates. 
However, they cautioned that the cost of eliminating 
the last dollar of fraud, as opposed to the first, would 
be prohibitively expensive. There are clearly diminish-
ing marginal returns in this struggle.
  Yet, if criminals are deterred in one area, they 
may increase efforts elsewhere. As Avivah Litan, from 
Gartner, warned, there is the risk that fraud might 
continue to migrate to more vulnerable sectors, away 
22 Fraud numbers are notoriously difficult to calculate and incompletely 
understood, perhaps preventing full acknowledgment of the scope of the 
problem. For instance, while the net fraud loss to issuers has been stable 
at a fairly manageable 6 to 7 basis points, conference participants noted 
that merchants and acquirers absorb at least another  to 7 basis points of 
losses and chargebacks. Another, unquantified amount of fraud is handled 
through direct mediation between consumers and merchants. Thus, a nu-
anced view of the extent of fraud, looking across all stakeholders, suggests 
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from the oversight of the card industry, where it may 
be even harder to detect, less publicized, and more 
difficult to eradicate. For instance, if the card industry 
maintains and increases its robust defenses, fraudsters 
are likely to turn their attention to other areas such as 
ACH, checks, and brokerage accounts. At the same 
time, some have also warned that the U.S. payment 
card industry, thus far successfully reliant on magnetic 
stripe authentication technology, may become more 
vulnerable as card programs abroad implement chip 
and PIN technology more widely and fraudsters move 
to the less secure U.S. markets. 
  Merchants are conflicted. While they may bear 
the costs of chargebacks, they also look to increase 
throughput at the point of sale, and thus they may be 
less inclined to embrace techniques that cause more 
hassle in the checkout line. Moreover, there are dif-
ficult tradeoffs between the customer experience and 
data security. Lee Manfred, of First Annapolis, noted 
that some merchants have argued that there are real 
benefits to the customer experience from saving data. 
For instance, popular in-store loyalty programs that 
identify customers at checkout are often built around 
merchant-based storage of some types of customer in-
formation. Yet, in the never-ending quest to speed con-
sumers through the checkout line more quickly, some 
merchants may be unwittingly creating attractive tar-
gets for criminals and increasing their susceptibility to 
the consequences of human error. All things equal, the 
more consumer information that is stored, the greater 
the repercussions if it is compromised. 
  Russell W. Schrader, from Visa USA, echoed 
these thoughts but emphasized that all payments sys-
tem stakeholders benefit from a free and efficient flow 
of information. For example, instant credit approv-
als for new store credit applications are valuable to 
merchants and helpful to consumers, but at the same 
time, they present a potential security risk. All of these 
tradeoffs expose the tensions inherent in the campaign 
to improve security; finding a reasonable balance to 
accommodate legitimate needs while guarding security 
is essential.
  There is also the free-rider issue. In some 
cases, the ultimate benefits to an investment in secu-
rity may not directly accrue to the party making the 
initial investment. Stated differently, some people have 
argued that participants in the payment system may 
rely on investment by other parties rather than doing 
so internally. Following this reasoning, a given firm may 
count on others in the industry to make the invest-
ment, relying on being able to benefit from the work of 
others. This reasoning may lead to suboptimal levels of 
investment overall. 
  At the same time, many recently publicized 
data breaches have been occurring outside the finan-
cial industry altogether. Conference participants cited 
incidents at the Veterans Administration, at universi-
ties, and at hospitals. Like financial institutions, these 
entities also have benefited greatly from the ability 
to access and manipulate large amounts of consumer 
information, and they too have an interest in main-
taining the flow of information. Yet, to the extent that 
actual losses occur as a consequence of data breaches 
at these institutions, banks themselves may ultimately 
bear much of the cost.
  There are ways to confront these challenges. 
Conference participants suggested that one way to 
modify the incentive equation for nonbanks would be 
a mandate that consumers be informed about every 
breach, regardless of scale, scope, or the potential for 
damage. While such a scheme may not be practical, it 
would clearly serve as a powerful incentive for all in-
volved in the storage or transmission of sensitive con-
sumer data to actively work to prevent breaches. 
  Echoing Swindle’s comments that data secu-
rity is good business, conference participants observed 
that there are also intrinsic reasons for companies 
to invest in data security technologies and practices. 
Besides the insurance value provided by enhanced 
security infrastructure, such tools can be leveraged for 
other business purposes. For instance, Brian Triplett, 
from VISA USA, suggested that the same mechanisms 
used for real-time authentication of a cardholder could 
be adapted to allow for more secure real-time reward 
programs at the point of sale.
  Consumers also have a role to play, but they, 
too, face mixed incentives. The substantial consumer 
protection rights afforded by Reg E and Reg Z, plus 
those of the networks that limit liability for fraudulent 
payment card use, caused some conference participants 
to suggest that these safeguards may serve to dissuade 
consumers from doing their part.
23  This misalignment 
is significant, since, ultimately, consumers, who do not 
generally bear the direct costs of fraudulent transac-
23 For a more detailed discussion of the problem of incentives in the adop-
tion of best practices in the payments industry, see Mark Furletti, “The 
Laws, Regulations, and Industry Practices That Protect Consumers Who 
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tions, are in the driver’s seat with respect to adopting 
more secure payment methods. However, in the end, 
consumers do pay in the form of higher prices that 
merchants and banks pass on to their customers.
  Consumers could contribute to the fight 
against fraud in a number of ways, with benefits to 
themselves and to the payments industry. For in-
stance, the Javelin study indicated that consumers who 
monitored their financial accounts online discovered 
fraudulent activities in 22 days, with total fraud losses 
averaging $3,806, compared to 67 days and losses of 
$6,383, for those who did not manage their accounts 
this way.
24  Regardless of whether fraud is a result of an 
actual data breach or due to simple card theft, con-
sumer vigilance and involvement are important. Clear-
ly, it is worthwhile to encourage the use of existing and 
emerging technological solutions that help to control 
fraud at the same time that they provide additional 
benefit to the consumer.
  How might consumers respond if asked to play 
a more prominent role? Evidence regarding consumer 
preferences and attitudes toward potentially more in-
trusive security mechanisms is generally inconclusive. 
Some industry participants report success: Stacie E. 
McGinn described how Bank of America introduced 
a “site key” program to better authenticate users for 
online banking. According to McGinn, consumers re-
garded this positively, and such innovations in security 
measures are likely to influence customers’ banking 
choices.
  But industry participants foresee asymmetry 
in consumer attitudes between threats to banking and 
debit products and those to credit. Conference par-
ticipants indicated that consumers are willing to use 
PINs and other technologies to safeguard their demand 
deposit accounts because doing so protects “their” 
money. In contrast, they may be less likely to submit 
to additional conditions on the use of credit cards 
because these products do not present an immediate 
threat to their own funds and because issuer and asso-
ciation policies, in addition to the provisions of Reg Z, 
mean that consumer liability is limited.
  Conference participants agreed that the pay-
ments industry will need to devise ways to entice 
consumers to buy into data protection programs.  The 
most robust fraud detection systems and data security 
programs can be rendered ineffective if carelessness 
and human error are not controlled.  Education and 
creation of appropriate incentives, along with imple-
mentation of less intrusive technologies, will be a start-
ing point.
X. Preventing Breaches
  Ultimately, a concerted effort by all stakehold-
ers will be necessary to contend with the threats to the 
industry. Michael Eubanks, of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, warned that we are past the era of the 
“hobbyist” hacker. Threats are expanding and becom-
ing more sophisticated as hackers move offshore and 
become professional. In fact, some criminals know as 
much about the U.S. banking industry as do knowl-
edgeable insiders, presenting a formidable challenge to 
even the most well-designed policies. In some respects, 
fraud management is a game of catch-up. 
  To address this threat, it may not be possible 
to outsmart the criminals; rather, organizations can 
and should work to contain and mitigate the damage 
that fraudsters might achieve. To do so, implementing 
a commonsense security program is the first step. An 
effective data security program starts with a rigorous 
internal audit of systems and practices. 
  Joel Winston outlined a commonsense frame-
work for structuring this process: The organization 
should seek to catalog what information is collected; 
where it is; whether it is needed; who is accessing it; 
and whether third parties see it. In general, a guiding 
principle is to not store data that aren’t needed. At the 
same time, the organization must know who has access 
to data and be able to justify why they have such ac-
cess. Finally, firms can benefit from implementing a sys-
tem to generate an audit trail for sensitive information, 
allowing personnel to track when data were accessed 
and by whom. 
  In addition to reviewing internal data security 
policies and procedures, Alberto Soliño, from Core 
Security Technologies, outlined how technological 
solutions can be applied to gauge and enhance a firm’s 
preparedness for malicious attacks from the outside. 
Soliño detailed two mechanisms — vulnerability scan-
ning and penetration testing — that can be used to 
complement a robust information security audit.  He 
explained that vulnerability scans are not intended 
24 This is a disturbing statistic in light of the fact that some reports suggest 
that consumers may be reluctant to use online banking services because of 
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to penetrate safeguards or exploit holes but rather 
are used to detect evidence of vulnerable software, 
inadequate security patches, or misconfigurations of 
software. Penetration testing typically follows the scan, 
during which data security experts will attempt to 
compromise security using the same advanced tactics 
as an attacker to evaluate how easily systems are com-
promised and how much a criminal could exploit in 
the event security is compromised.
  Together, systematizing practices, conducting 
an audit of internal data-handling procedures and safe-
guards, implementing an audit trail, and conducting 
rigorous vulnerability scans and penetration testing can 
provide a solid foundation for deterring attackers and 
limiting the damage from data breaches.
XI. Making the Data Useless to 
Criminals
  Going further, Brian Triplett emphasized that 
the most effective way to control the damage from a 
breach if it does occur is to “make the data useless” 
— that is, have infrastructure in place such that even 
if data are compromised, they cannot be used to access 
cardholder accounts. To do so, all in the payments in-
dustry, Triplett suggested, should look for ways to make 
transaction-level data dynamic or unique and to en-
crypt data at the point of sale. This is a more sophisti-
cated approach than merely “replacing a static method 
with another static method.” The approach should 
allow for flexibility over time and can limit exposure to 
a single point of failure. If a static method is compro-
mised, all data could be at risk.
  In his forward-looking view, Triplett added 
that any new solutions should minimize the impact to 
the payment system and be quickly deployable. They 
should be designed to be minimally intrusive to the 
consumer while supporting other business drivers as 
much as possible. Solutions should look to the future 
and be extensible so that they can accommodate 
changes in authentication technology or procedures. 
Above all, new solutions should be aligned with the 
industry to ensure broad buy-in and they should be 
globally interoperable in order to maintain the integra-
tion of payments internationally.    
  In general, authorization decisions should be 
based on more than just card and account data. There 
should be a mechanism for asking the consumer for 
more information if a fraudulent transaction is suspect-
ed. Addressing the market challenges, Triplett suggest-
ed that by targeting high-risk transactions, merchants 
can avoid adding time or complexity to ordinary trans-
actions by legitimate consumers, thereby minimizing 
the impact on customers’ experience and throughput 
at checkout.
  Additionally, organizations that process pay-
ment card transactions should work toward achiev-
ing full PCI compliance. Michael Cunningham, from 
Chase Cardmember Services, explained that the Pay-
ment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard is 
a collaborative effort of the major card networks and 
issuers to safeguard customer information. Visa,  
MasterCard, American Express, Discover, and JCB 
mandate that merchants and service providers meet 
certain minimum standards of security when they 
store, process, and transmit cardholder data.
2 
  Thus far, the PCI standard has had mixed suc-
cess. Most observers and industry participants at the 
conference argued that it is a well-designed, rigorous 
standard. In fact, Cunningham asserted that there has 
never been a security breach at a genuinely PCI-com-
pliant merchant. Unfortunately, this standard has yet 
to be universally accepted, thus limiting its effective-
ness. For instance, Visa reports that only 22 percent of 
its largest merchants were PCI-compliant as of early 
2006.
26  This may be the case for a number of reasons 
— and those same reasons apply to other security-ori-
ented initiatives in the payments arena as well.
  Paul Tomasofsky, of Two Sparrows Consulting, 
ventured that PCI’s incomplete adoption may in part 
be due to the fact that some merchants see PCI as an-
other “card” mandate. In other words, they look upon 
these recommendations as regulations promulgated 
from outside the merchant community by organiza-
tions that aren’t themselves immersed in the complexi-
ties and challenges of the retail industry. He further 
suggested that for many, implementing the PCI stan-
2 The PCI standard mandates a number of data security practices. For 
instance, it requires SSL encryption of databases that store or process data, 
two-factor authentication at POS terminals, a log of all access to credit 
card data, and a well-implemented firewall. It also prescribes network 
intrusion testing and annual or quarterly penetration testing conducted 
by an approved external vendor. More details can be found at http://usa.
visa.com/download/business/accepting_visa/ops_risk_management/cisp_
PCI_Data_Security_Standard.pdf or at https://sdp.mastercardintl.com/pdf/
pcd_manual.pdf. 
26 Cards International, “PCI council set up by global payment networks,” 
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dards may not be perceived as a profitable undertaking 
— requiring investment in technology and education 
— and for smaller merchants, perhaps beyond their 
capabilities. 
  On the other hand, Tom Arnold argued, the 
networks, acquirers, and issuers on the supply side of 
the payments industry who are promoting the initiative 
have not done enough to communicate the benefits 
and means to achieve compliance to processors and 
merchants. Furthermore, participants suggested that 
without punitive sanctions and the prospect of fines for 
noncompliance, market incentives alone may not be 
sufficient to motivate the holdouts. Yet, Arnold noted, 
unilateral sanctions imposed by the issuing and acquir-
ing banks and card networks may have unintended 
consequences. For instance, given the competitive 
merchant-acquiring landscape, a merchant facing ear-
nest demands to make serious improvements to its in-
formation security could sidestep penalties by moving 
to a new acquiring bank.
27  
  Tomasofsky also observed that a number of 
factors make implementing PCI and more rigorous 
security practices generally more difficult. Doing so re-
quires the involvement of a firm’s key management and 
the participation of staff from many levels. Turnover 
and costs of implementation make this tough. Com-
pounding the challenge is the fact that some firms see 
the secure coding guidelines as vague, and documen-
tation requirements are a hurdle for many firms not 
accustomed to this sort of discipline. However, with 
vendor-based solutions emerging, and the recognition 
that PCI compliance can produce very salient benefits, 
especially for merchants with less established brands, 
enthusiasm has been mounting.
  Ronald Congemi, from First Data, noted that 
key differences between the orientations of merchants 
and financial institutions can account for a different 
level of commitment to security investments. For banks 
and other payments providers, money and customer 
information is effectively their main product; as Orson 
Swindle remarked, they have “grown up” being good at 
protecting it. Moreover, despite large differences in size 
and scope, banks tend to be more homogeneous and 
far fewer in number than the disparate mix of retailers 
and processors that plug into the other end of the pay-
ment system.
  Congemi called for increased involvement 
from federal entities, particularly the FTC, in order to 
overcome the coordination challenges. He argued that 
this body is well suited to encourage national retailing 
federations and other nonbanks to sit down with bank-
ing organizations such as the ABA to work together to 
find solutions. 
  Coordination among the various stakeholders 
is critically important, a goal made more difficult by 
the fact that they do not always share the same priori-
ties. As Orson Swindle recommended, everyone who 
touches the data should be taking steps to protect it. 
Yet, this is made more complicated because banks, 
which maintain the direct customer relationship, may 
not know everyone who touches customers’ data, pos-
ing a significant coordination problem.
28  Brian Triplett 
spoke for many when he declared that “we’re all in this 
together.” Therefore, intelligent and effective solutions 
must include input from issuers, networks, retailers, 
government, and consumers, as well as their active 
participation. A top-down solution imposed by the 
banking industry or an approach adopted by a subset of 
parties will not work.
  The recent announcement of the PCI Security 
Standards Council and the release of version .
29 of 
the PCI Data Security Standard reflect the industry’s 
acknowledgment of this need for broad-based involve-
ment. The council’s goal is to accelerate the adoption 
of the PCI standard, employing several approaches.
30  
First, the council intends to streamline the process of 
attaining compliance and to increase lead times for 
adopting and implementing the standard. Second, the 
council will create a consortium of technology provid-
ers and consultants who will be available to assist com-
panies in meeting the standards while providing train-
ing and certification opportunities. Finally, the council 
intends to seek input from the diverse stakeholders in 
the payments industry, inviting companies that partici-
27 Arnold suggested several strategies that might be effective in addressing 
this challenge. First, merchant acquiring banks could be required to dem-
onstrate that they have a program in place to bring their merchants into 
compliance with the standard. Second, they could be required to provide 
audited counts of the number of merchants that are registered and PCI-
certified. Finally, they could be prohibited  from signing up new merchants 
who have been the subject of a security compromise and who have not yet 
demonstrated their compliance with the PCI standards. 
28 Lee Manfred warned that there are between 2,000 and 0,000 entities 
in the U.S. that may touch cardholder data. 
29  This standard is available for download at 
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/tech/download_the_pci_dss.htm. 
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pate in the initiative to comment on changes to rules, 
as well as soliciting their input on the selection of the 
PCI Security Standards Council’s board of advisors.
XII. If a Breach Occurs
  Even with the best procedures and safeguards 
in place, breaches can still happen. What are the re-
sponsibilities of payments participants in the event of 
a breach? What should be disclosed after a breach, 
when, and by whom? 
  Susanna Montezemolo, of Consumers’ Union, 
addressed the needs of consumers for information 
in the event that their private information has been 
compromised. She noted that today’s notifications are 
often unnecessarily complicated and effectively “writ-
ten by lawyers, for lawyers.” Instead, she urged that no-
tifications be simple and written for the layperson; they 
should say exactly what information was compromised; 
and they should explain how consumers can take ad-
vantage of their rights under state and federal law for 
protection against misuse of the data.
  Montezemolo argued that notification should 
come from the entity with which consumers have a 
financial relationship, such as the card-issuing bank, 
even if the breach occurred elsewhere in the process-
ing chain.
3  Citing the CardSystems case, she observed 
that notifications from unfamiliar entities often do not 
attract the consumer’s attention. Others suggested that 
having the firm responsible for the breach provide noti-
fication may not be practical. As Kathy Kauffman, from 
Capital One, observed, many merchants and processors 
simply do not have address information for all of their 
end customers. A related notification problem is that 
unless notification responsibilities are clear, a consumer 
could get multiple notification letters from downstream 
firms, likely with inconsistent details. When this hap-
pens, customers could be confused and not realize that 
multiple notices pertain to a single incident. These 
various complications led conference participants to 
argue for a consistent disclosure protocol, understood 
by all payment stakeholders and by consumers.
  After a breach has occurred and consumers 
have been notified, Montezemolo suggested several 
strategies that consumers might employ to protect 
themselves from being victims of identity theft or 
fraud. First, she argued that consumers should place 
a fraud alert on their credit file. Fraud alerts are a 
provision of the FACT Act that require lenders who 
obtain credit reports from the three credit bureaus to 
take additional steps to verify the consumer’s identity 
before making a loan or extending credit. An initial 
fraud alert will be in place on a person’s credit report 
for 90 days. It can be instituted whenever a consumer 
suspects he or she has been or could be a victim of 
identity theft. “Proven victims”
32 of identity theft may 
also opt for an extended alert, which will remain on 
the credit report for up to seven years.
  The FACT Act also entitles consumers to a 
free credit report every 2 months from each of the 
three nationwide consumer reporting agencies. These 
credit reports can be used to monitor credit-related ac-
tivity. Alternatively, consumers could engage a for-fee 
credit monitoring service. However, Montezemolo sug-
gested that self-monitoring may be as effective and less 
expensive.
33 
  A more potent tool, allowed by some, but not 
all, states, is to enact a “security freeze” on the ac-
count. Montezemolo indicated that 20 states currently 
offer no-fault policies by which anyone — regardless of 
whether they have been victimized  — can freeze their 
credit file. Five states restrict this right to identity theft 
victims only. Once enacted, security freezes effectively 
block lenders from accessing the credit report. Fees for 
these services vary across states: They range from free 
to $20 to place a freeze and from free to around $0 to 
lift one. It is generally free to victims of identity theft 
and sometimes for other special classes (such as the 
military and the elderly).
  Montezemolo argued that, of the two tools, 
fraud alerts are of less benefit because they put sig-
3 Montezemolo suggested that in such cases, even if the notification is 
sent out under the aegis of the financial institution, it would be reasonable 
for the responsible party to pay for the cost of telling consumers about the 
breach. 
32 A consumer can achieve this by filing an identity theft report with the 
FTC and other relevant parties. This process typically has two phases: the 
first is a report submitted to a local, state, or federal law enforcement agen-
cy that details facts such as the dates of the identity theft, the fraudulent 
accounts opened, the suspected perpetrator, and so forth. The second is 
typically used in conjunction with the law enforcement report by the credit 
reporting agency to conduct its own internal investigation. See http://www.
consumer.gov/idtheft/. 
33 Indeed, various forms of account and credit self-monitoring appear to 
generate better results. In its analysis of the consequences of identity theft, 
Javelin reported that consumers uncover 47 percent of identity fraud cases 
by examining their financial statements. Doing so results in faster detection 
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nificant onus on the individual and will do little to 
prevent illicit use of the data. Security freezes, on the 
other hand, are much more effective — especially for 
those who have not yet been a victim of fraud. How-
ever, they obviously serve as a substantial obstacle 
to legitimate credit inquiries and can even present 
problems when consumers apply for jobs or insurance 
coverage. Montezemolo suggested that one potential 
means for overcoming this obstacle would be to restrict 
access to credit reports through the use of PINs. While 
this strategy would introduce its own concerns about 
implementation, it would help to preserve much of the 
convenience of instant credit approvals.
  Evidence suggests that consumers’ response to 
security freezes has thus far been limited. Stuart Pratt 
reports that perhaps 9,000 people in California to date 
have taken advantage of this sort of protection. Since 
California has been a leader in making this remedy 
available, the limited interest in that state is notable. 
However, it is not clear why more consumers have not 
responded; some conference attendees suggested that 
consumers might feel that the remedy is not effective 
for their particular situation or they may not realize it 
is available to them or understand how it can be imple-
mented.
XIII. Creating Effective Disclosures
  Montezemolo’s presentation highlighted the 
challenges inherent in designing effective data breach 
notifications that respond effectively to the needs of 
the different stakeholders in the payment system. Tra-
ditionally, state and federal government entities have 
had a role to play in resolving some of the conflicting 
points of view in this area. However, conference par-
ticipants noted that the laws governing these issues are 
still being developed and show a great deal of diversity. 
Indeed, 23 states have currently enacted some sort of 
legislation related to security breach notifications, and 
another 6 have legislation in process.
34   
  Luckily, many of these state laws and proposals 
generally cover similar themes, and conference par-
ticipants touched on several areas relevant to effective 
notification about security breaches. First, what type 
of data should be subject to breach legislation? For in-
stance, Social Security numbers are typically included, 
but they alone are often not sufficient in enabling 
fraud; other data must be included as well. Second, 
who is responsible for making the notification? Here, 
much new state legislation resembles the California 
standard; that is, the notification should be sent by 
any firm conducting business in the state that believes 
that personal identifying information under its control 
has been acquired by an unauthorized person. Another 
issue to be resolved is whether a breach that involves 
only encrypted data warrants the same sort of notifica-
tion as one where unencrypted data are compromised.
  Third, how will individuals be notified: in 
writing, electronically, by phone, or in another man-
ner? Must they be notified if there is no likelihood of 
reasonable harm arising due to the breach?
3 Finally, 
how soon must notification take place? The California 
law calls for the “most expedient time possible and 
without unreasonable delay.” Other states specify a 
4-day window.
36   
  It appears that a consensus is arising that these 
points should be addressed generally in legislation deal-
ing with breach notifications. Yet, as Stuart Pratt not-
ed, many existing state laws still suffer from ambiguities 
and are not consistent across the country, especially in 
terms of the details related to implementation. Pratt 
explained that staying abreast of the developments 
and complying with disparate standards are seen to be 
considerable challenges for payments providers operat-
ing in multiple states. In response, some have called for 
some type of federal standard to improve consistency 
and ease compliance.
  Others have suggested that a national firm 
could circumvent the problem presented by the pano-
ply of state laws by seeking to comply with the strictest 
state law on the books. Leaving aside the policy ques-
tion — that some states would effectively be setting 
a federal standard — this may not even be practical. 
While a given state’s law may indeed be the strictest 
34 VigilantMinds, Inc., “State Security Breach Legislation,” February 2006. 
3 The Ponemon-White & Case survey indicates that 82 percent of people 
think it is always necessary to report a breach “even if the lost or stolen data 
was encrypted, or there was no criminal intent.”
36 Irrespective of how and when the law comes to pass, consumers have in-
dicated the importance they ascribe to effective notification about breaches. 
The Ponemon-White & Case survey suggested that the quality of the notifi-
cation and the manner in which it is delivered are crucial if an organization 
wants to protect its reputation and maintain customers’ trust in the event 
of an actual breach. In fact, the survey results indicated that consumers are 
four times more likely to close an account if they are not notified in a “clear, 
consistent, and timely fashion.” The survey suggests that telephone calls 
and personalized letters were three times more effective at preventing cus-
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available, it may also have specific provisions that con-
flict with those of other states. 
  In recent years, many legislative proposals 
have come through Congress; Pratt cited five or six 
that remain active. Of those, two bills offer the prom-
ise of a standardized approach to notification language 
and procedures. One, championed by Senator Arlen 
Specter, emerged from the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee. Bill S332 is entitled the Personal Data Privacy 
and Security Act.
37  The second, HR427,
38 entitled 
the Data Accountability and Trust Act, has emerged 
from the House of Representatives, and it shares many 
characteristics with the Senate version.
39 
  However, more work remains to be done. Ac-
cording to Pratt, the major federal legislation is en-
cumbered with language that addresses issues outside 
the core problem of data breaches. He also noted that 
conflicting jurisdictions and the interplay between 
various congressional committees complicates the 
legislative process further. Additionally, Pratt observed 
that the principal federal legislative proposals leave im-
portant issues about implementation unresolved, don’t 
define what constitutes a “trigger event,” and do not 
specify how a firm should determine if a breach would 
be likely to pose a “significant risk” of identity theft. 
These questions and other remaining differences in 
legislation may need to be resolved before the resulting 
framework is effective, intelligible, and viable for orga-
nizations that act nationally and internationally.
XIV. Next Steps
  Consistent regulation is just one of the chal-
lenges in this area that may benefit from the involve-
ment of an impartial entity with national reach.  Some 
conference participants suggested that the Federal 
Reserve might be able to play an instrumental role as 
well in several areas. First, it can leverage its relation-
ships with community banks and educators to help 
communicate the nuances of identity theft to consum-
ers and disseminate information about what can be 
done to safeguard data.
40  Similarly, the Fed could help 
to overcome the difficulty in measuring fraud due to 
disincentives to report, differences in terminology, and 
the need to coordinate data from a large set of diverse 
participants.
  More broadly, as this recent conference dem-
onstrated, the Federal Reserve is able to convene the 
“right people at the right time.” Paul Tomasofsky com-
mented that by providing a neutral meeting place and 
motivating discussion, the Federal Reserve and other 
responsible entities can spur the sort of cross-industry 
dialog and cooperation that will be needed to fashion 
credible responses to this problem. Moreover, to the 
extent that there is a role for regulatory oversight or 
guidance, the Fed can help to inform policymakers 
throughout the bank regulatory community.
  Third, as Orson Swindle noted, government 
agencies, including the Federal Reserve, are in the best 
position to serve as advocates on the international 
stage. While some payments participants, such as the 
major card networks, do have a large international 
presence, even they do not enjoy sufficient leverage to 
bring together all the parties, including law enforce-
ment and banking regulators, necessary to devise the 
interoperable solutions needed to confront fraudsters 
that operate globally.
  Finally, the Federal Reserve, in particular, 
is well placed to lead by example. Bruce Summers 
highlighted areas where the Fed has taken the lead in 
building robust and secure systems and practices. Giv-
en the Federal Reserve’s critical role in the payments 
infrastructure, these procedures must stand up to the 
most exacting scrutiny. They may serve as a model for 
other financial institutions and payments participants. 
XV. Conclusion
  Over the course of the two days, attendees 
agreed that data breaches and other security threats 
are a real, insidious, and growing problem. While the 
situation is not yet dire, it is serious enough to warrant 
earnest attention from the many parties that interact 
with the payment system. However, responses should 
40 As Ron Congemi observed, the Federal Reserve has a long-standing tra-
dition of financial education.
37 This bill has been placed on the calendar of business but has not been 
scheduled for a vote. It can be viewed in its entirety at: http://www.
govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/09/s/s332.pdf. 
38 http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/09/h/h427.pdf. 
39 Arguably, business favors the House bill. The bill offers full preemption 
of state laws about data breaches, as opposed to merely preempting laws 
related to a consumer’s right to modify incorrect credit report information. 
Additionally, the House version does not require a breach to be reported if 
there is no “reasonable basis to conclude that there is a significant risk of 
identity theft.” A more detailed analysis of the differences between these 
legislative proposals and other related bills is available from Consumers 
Union: http://www.consumersunion.org/pdf/fed_security09.pdf. Information Security, Data Breaches, and Protecting Cardholder Information    2  www.philadelphiafed.org/pcc
be carefully considered and reflect the fact that there 
is not one single problem and there is not one single 
solution. A sentiment echoed several times during the 
conference is that industry participants really are con-
fronting two problems — actual fraud and consumer 
perceptions of fraud — that call for distinctly different 
solutions. It is important to respond to both the actual 
threat and the legitimate concerns of consumers while 
helping to inform the public. 
  Fortunately, many useful tools are already 
available to respond to actual threats to payments-
related data. Technology, investment, education, co-
operation, and a standard for best practices are a start. 
In general, it makes sense to do the simple things first 
while looking to the future to ensure that quick fixes 
are not easily thwarted by increasingly sophisticated 
professional criminals. At the same time, as Alberto 
Soliño urged, organizations should assume that they 
will be subject to a breach and plan accordingly. It is 
too late to put appropriate responses in place after a 
breach has occurred.
  Besides addressing the external threats and 
internal vulnerabilities, organizations must be prepared 
to be proactive in interactions with policymakers, con-
sumers, and the media. Good security practices and 
investments, while costly, can and should be regarded 
as assets. Judiciously communicating the benefits of 
these tools to customers is a good way to unlock the 
value of such investment. After that, education is the 
next step, in particular, education focused on the dif-
ferent types of fraud associated with data breaches, 
including identity theft, and the risks associated with 
each. Additionally, creating an effective and standard-
ized disclosure system and establishing relationships 
with different constituencies remain important. 
  These measures are all directed to ensuring 
that information keeps flowing. As Orson Swindle and 
other participants emphasized throughout the confer-
ence, the very business of payments is built around the 
efficient transmission and use of information. Security 
breaches, especially ones that are highly publicized and 
often misunderstood by consumers and the media, do 
much to imperil this dynamic. Adequately responding 
to data breaches and other security threats is costly, 
but not doing so will be more costly — in terms of both 
the financial costs today and the opportunity cost of 
lost business in the future. Organizations unwilling to 
make the necessary investments today may not enjoy 
an opportunity to do so in the future. Information Security, Data Breaches, and Protecting Cardholder Information    23  www.philadelphiafed.org/pcc
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